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Abstract 
This paper investigates the issue of political feasibility of a road pricing 
policies (RPP). Referring to a literature developed in international trade 
theory (Fernandez, Rodrick, [1]), this paper presents a model regarding the 
role and relevance of individual specific uncertainty in explaining the 
political acceptability of RPP. It is shown that: a) without money transfers, 
i.e., reimbursements of the tax levied, and with no uncertainty, RPP might not 
be accepted thus giving rise to an evident trade-off between economic 
efficiency and political acceptability; b) when individual specific uncertainty 
is assumed, optimal level of RPP, may, under given conditions concerning the 
number of voters and people' preferences, become politically acceptable. Two 
different strategies can be envisaged to render RPP politically feasible: 
gradual and radical. The first strategy foresees a low corrective tax that 
eliminates only a small proportion of the excessive use of the public good and 
provides an acceptable balance between monetary loss and environment 
improvement. Alternatively, a radical strategy would foresee a much higher 
level of tax substantially reducing the number of people consuming the public 
good and providing a potentially higher and concentrated payoff to those still 
consuming it after the policy is implemented. This latter policy appears more 
easily sustainable under majority than unanimity voting.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
The relevance of the acceptability problem when considering road pricing 
policies (RPP) is testified by the uneasiness it provokes within the economic 
community. In fact, the fundamental problem facing politicians and 
economists alike is the acceptability of such kind of policies This has clearly 
been stated by Lave [2] when he writes: ''[it] has been a commonplace event 
for transportation economists to put the conventional diagram on the board, 
note the self-evident optimality of pricing solutions, and then sit down 
waiting for the world to adopt this obviously correct solution. Well, we have 
been waiting for seventy years now, and it's worth asking what are the facets 
of the problem that we have been missing. Why is the world reluctant to do 
the obvious?''  
Numerous contributions in the literature as well as projects financed by the 
EU, national and local governments testify the importance attributed to this 
problem. The analysis concerning the justification of the scarce 
implementation of RPP has followed different avenues. Take, for instance, 
Jones [3,4,5] who enumerates a number of issues that should be taken care of 
in order to make road pricing acceptable: i) make sure the objectives of the 
scheme meet the main public concerns; ii) demonstrate that there are no 
effective alternative solutions; iii) hypothecate the revenues and provide 
alternatives; iv) keep the scheme as simple as possible; v) consider carefully 
all technological issues; vi) address equity issues.  
Starting from a psychological perspective Schade and Schlag, [6] suggest that 
road pricing acceptability is strictly intertwined with the following issues: i) 
problem perception; ii) mobility related social norms; iii) importance of the 
aims to be reached by the measures; iv) perceived effectiveness and 
efficiency of the policy; v) equity; vi) revenue allocation; vii) attribution of 
responsibility; viii) information and awareness.1  
Although all the above mentioned issues have undoubtedly an important role 
to play in explaining the practical implementation of RPP, we believe that 
further insights could be gained by looking at a different framework on 
which to base the political acceptability analysis, one based on uncertainty. 
Even if interesting theoretical considerations explaining the present 
implementation level of RPP can be traced within the wide public choice 
                                                 
1 See also AFFORD, 1998-2000 [7], as well as other contributions included in this volume. 
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literature,2 this paper will try to complement these explanations by looking at 
the interrelations among uncertainty, voting, and political acceptability. It is 
safe to say that there is no one single reason capable of explaining the 
political and social diffidence towards this kind of policy and its scarce 
implementation; however, we believe that models based on uncertainty can 
help explaining the actual degree of political acceptability of RPP.  
This paper presents a model regarding the role and relevance of individual 
specific uncertainty in explaining the acceptability of RPP. The main 
assumptions of the model are: (a) the decisions concerning the adoption of 
RPP are taken by politicians that operate under a re-election constraint and 
have perfect foresight on the aggregate voting intentions of their constituency. 
Such politicians will, therefore, promote only those policies that would pass 
an election test; (b) the agents of the economy are perfectly rational and 
informed but uncertain about their personal evaluation of the public good 
(e.g., environment quality) after a RPP is adopted. The first assumption 
stresses the obvious concern of politicians about the acceptability of a policy 
by the majority of citizens. The second indicates that the paper focuses on the 
individual specific uncertainty arising once the policy is adopted. This is an 
ex post type of uncertainty, assumed here to concern each individual's 
evaluation for the environment. This is a simple way to represent different ex 
ante inviduals' evaluations of a RPP that is expected to hurt consumers 
differently according to their ex post preferences. This latter assumption is 
sufficient to provide many interesting results on the ex ante political 
acceptability of a RPP under no reimbursement of the revenues raised by the 
policy. As unusual as this assumption might seem, this paper will argue that 
the results of the model similarly hold if an individual specific form of 
uncertainty is put on the reimbursement that each individual's expects by the 
government once the RPP is adopted.  
We list the main results of the paper. These are: without money transfers, i.e., 
reimbursements of the tax levied, and with no uncertainty, RPP will not be 
accepted, thus giving rise to an evident trade-off between economic efficiency 
and political acceptability; when assuming a high degree of individual 
specific uncertainty, the optimal level of RPP, may, under given  
                                                 
2 The failure in adopting potentially Pareto-improving policies could be explained, for instance, via: the 
different organizational ability of lobbies (Goldestein [7]), pressure groups (Denzau and Munger, [8]), 
policy time inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott [9]; Brennan and Buchanan [10]; Zax, [11]), policy 
spatial inconsistency (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, [12]), polticians' credibility (Persson and 
Tabellini, [13,14]). 
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conditions concerning the number of voters and people' preferences, become 
politically acceptable. Two different strategies can be envisaged to render 
RPP politically feasible: gradual and radical. The first strategy foresees a low 
corrective tax that eliminates only a small proportion of the excessive use of 
the public good and provides an acceptable balance between monetary loss 
and environment improvement. We show that such a policy can be made 
acceptable ex ante. Alternatively, a radical strategy would foresee a much 
higher level of tax thus substantially reducing the number of people 
consuming the public good but providing a potentially higher payoff to those 
still consuming it after the policy is implemented. Even in this case we show 
that, under specific conditions, the policy might be accepted ex ante. This 
policy appears more easily sustainable under majority than unanimity voting.  
 
2. Political acceptability 
 
In this paper we adopt a simplified definition of political acceptability. In 
particular, the political acceptability of a policy is just determined by the 
voting choice of those affected by it. Since the politicians have a perfect 
perception of the aggregate voting intentions and they operate under a re-
election constrain, they adopt only those policies that guarantee an ex ante 
majority. Only those policies that will guarantee at least a 50% plus one vote 
perceived benefit for the electorate will be promoted. The individuals, on 
their part, have, except for the policy influences on their personal evaluation 
of the environment, a perfect knowledge and foresight of the effects of the 
policy. The voting mechanism is very simple: agents will vote in favor of the 
policy only if its effects, evaluated ex ante, will be favorable for them 
compared to the initial situation. In other words, the expected utility derived 
by the policy will have to be greater than the utility enjoyed before the policy 
is adopted.  
Our paper focuses on the role and effects of individual specific uncertainty in 
determining the political viability of the policy when facing a voting test. In 
fact we concentrate our attention on the role that individual specific 
uncertainty might have in explaining why even an ex post potentially-Pareto-
improving manoeuvre might not be adopted were it to undergo a voting test. 
We argue that in presence of individual specific uncertainty the political 
viability of RPP cannot be properly evaluated by a simple interpretation of 
the aggregate policy effects. This would, in fact, provide no indications on the  
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specific individual voting intentions. Were aggregate welfare improving 
policies to undergo a voting test (e.g., referendum) before adoption they could 
fail a majority vote test. In the literature on political acceptability of RPP, the 
models adopted usually focus only on the general aggregate effects of such 
policies thus allowing only for normative prescriptions for an ideal policy 
rather than descriptions of policy implementation paths. Just to give an 
example, in an interesting paper, Evans [15] evaluates the desirability of a 
congestion pricing scheme, under both homogeneous and mixed traffic, 
according to the effects the policy has on consumer's surplus, government 
surplus and on the difference of these two aggregate values. However, the 
considerations reached by the author are silent on the actual incentive a 
generic consumer would have in voting pro or against its adoption and, 
therefore, the conclusions drawn cannot explain whether a politician would or 
would not be inclined to adopt the policy.  
The relevance of our approach to the analysis is reinforced by the fact 
that a welfare improving RPP with complete transfers is usually only a highly 
theoretical benchmark that may possess scarce practical relevance. We 
believe that there is a need to look at the political acceptability of RPPs 
before transfers and under uncertainty.  
 
2.1 Two simple numerical examples 
 
In this paragraph we will illustrate two simple numerical examples showing 
what are the effects provoked by the introduction of individual specific 
uncertainty when having to decide on the adoption of a welfare improving 
policy. The example, borrowed from the literature developed in international 
trade (see, for example, Rodrik and Fernandez [1]) shows how, under given 
assumptions, there can be a bias towards the status quo. On the other hand, 
we show that, in other cases, the presence of individual specific uncertainty 
can also facilitate the adoption of RPP. In other words, there can be both 
opposition and support to the adoption of efficiency improving reforms when 
some of the individual gainers and losers affected cannot be clearly identified 
beforehand. The main point is that there can both be policies supported by a 
majority ex post that could fail a voting test ex ante as well as policies that are 
supported ex ante but would not be voted for ex post.3  
                                                 
3 The failure in adopting potentially Pareto-improving policies could be explained, for instance, via: the 
different organizational ability of lobbies (Goldestein [7]), pressure groups (Denzau and Munger, [8]), 
policy time inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott [9]; Brennan and Buchanan [10]; Zax, [11]), policy 
spatial inconsistency (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, [12]), polticians' credibility (Persson and 
Tabellini, [13,14]). 
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Suppose that a continuum of risk neutral individuals are distributed along a 
line of length 0-1. Initially, a proportion 0,6 of the individuals are assumed to 
belong to the L-sector (on the left side of the segment) and 0,4 to the W-
sector (on the right side of the segment). Moreover, in a first example, we 
assume that the adoption of the policy: a) increases the return to the 
individuals in the W-sector of the economy (+ 0.2); b) lowers the returns to 
2/3 of the L-individuals (-0.2); c) increases the returns to 1/3 of the L-
individuals that, thus, move from the L-sector to the W-sector. In figure 1 we 
represent the ex post distributional outcome with the boxes describing the 
gains and losses occurring to the individuals belonging to the different parts 
of the segment.  
 
 
 
The majority is better off with the reform ex post 
 
The individuals already in the W sector will gain but there will also be a part 
of the individuals, previously belonging to the other sector (L) that will gain 
after the policy is adopted. Since the policy improves efficiency, there is an 
overall net gain of 0,04 (an amount of 0.2 gained by 0.2 of the losers that 
have become winners). The majority gains from the adoption of the policy 
and, in the case of complete certainty, the policy would be voted for.  
 
 
 
 
 
The majority votes against the reform ex ante 
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 Let us see whether there would still be a majority under uncertainty 
concerning who, among the losers, would move to the winners' group. Let us 
assume that there is an equal probability for any single individual belonging 
to the L-sector to move to W-sector. All individuals in the L-sector are ex 
ante identical. The uncertainty concerns the precise identity, not the total 
number of winners. When asked to cast their vote the individuals will 
calculate their personal expected payoff, calculated as a weighted average of 
gains and losses. The weights will depend on the probability of each outcome 
taking place (see figure 2).  
A simple calculation shows that the losers constitute the majority ex 
ante and the efficiency-enhancing policy will not be adopted. 4 Only members 
of the winners' group have positive utility, and the policy will not pass an ex 
ante voting test. In this example, the presence of individual-specific 
uncertainty distorts aggregate preferences.  
To illustrate the second example let us suppose an ex post situation as 
in figure 3 whereas the ex ante situation is described by figure 4. In this case, 
a proportion 0,4 of the individuals are assumed to initially belong to the L-
sector (on the left side of the segment) and 0,6 to the W-sector (on the right 
side of the segment).  
 
 
 
 
The majority is worse off with the reform ex post 
 
The ex ante calculation is as follows. Every member of the W-sector knows 
that 0.2 of them (0.2/0.6 = 1/3) will move to the L-sector, while 0.4 of them 
(0.4/0.6 = 2/3) will stay at the W-sector, even though not knowing who, 
among them, will actually change status.5 In this case, a potentially ex  
                                                 
4 The expected payoff of one representative (risk-neutral) loser can be calculated as 
( ) ( ) 067.02.0
6.0
2.02.0
6.0
4.0
≅+−+−−=EU   
5 The expected payoff of one (risk-neutral) representative winner can be calculated as 
( ) ( ) 1.01.0
6.0
2.02.0
6.0
4.0
≅−−++=EU  
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post undesirable situation gathers an ex ante support.  
 
 
 
 
 
The majority votes in favour of the reform ex ante  
The opposite results shown in the two examples mainly depend on 
two elements: payoffs of the agents and probability of the events.  
In the next section we focus our attention on a model possessing some 
of the features illustrated in the previous examples.  
 
3    The basic model 
We introduce a simple economy with a finite set of agents  
possessing preferences over a public good (e.g. environment) and a 
private good (e.g. car). Let agents' preferences be described by a Cobb-
Douglas utility function:  
{ }niN ,..,..1=
0≥z
0≥x
( ) βiaiiii xzxzu =,  
 
(1) 
 
The consumption of the private good originates a polluting emission 
.The emission technology is described by the following linear 
production function: 
0≥P
(2) iPx i =  
 
and emissions accumulate according to the following linear additive law:  
(3) ∑
∈
−=
Ni
iii Paz  
 
 
where is a parameter expressing every agent's evaluation of the quality of 
the pollution-free environment.
ia i
6 This parameter will play an important  role 
                                                 
6 Note that in the model, the agents' only constraint for the consumption of the private good is 
represented by the emission technology (2) that, through the cumulative law (3), reduces the quality of 
the public good available to all consumers. A part from this, agents will always be assumed endowed 
with a sufficient income to purchase, before any taxation takes place, a non negative equilibrium 
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in modelling the behavior of heterogenous agents. We associate to this 
economy the strategic form game { }( )Niii UXNG ∈= ,, , with players set , 
every agent's strategy space 
N
[ ]iPiX ,0=  where iP is such that iNi aP ≤∑ ∈ , and 
payoff functions are given by:  
( )ni P =,...,
1=
N
iP∑
−n
aai =
*
=Pi
( ) ( )
2
1+
**
1 ,..., PP ni
                                                                                                                              
(4) i
i
ii PaPU 


−
∈
 
 
 
where, for simplicity, = βα .7 In this way, the model possesses the well 
known strategic features of a player Cournot model with the choice 
variable given by the consumption of the private good and, consequently, a 
pollution level for every agent. iP
 
3.1    Homogeneous agents 
 
We introduce as a benchmark the case in which all agents possess the same 
evaluation of the quality of a free-pollution environment . From 
expression (1)-(3) it is straightforward to derive the level of pollution (and 
private good) selected by every agent at the unique interior Nash equilibrium 
as:  
 
1+n
a  (5) 
with associated the corresponding equilibrium payoff:  
(6) 
2= n
aU  
 
As usual for economies characterized by negative externalities, each agent's 
Nash equilibrium level of pollution is greater than the corresponding Pareto-
efficient one (for ), obtained by maximizing the sum of all agents' 
utilities
1>n
8 and equal to:  
ia
quantity of the private good. Regarding the assumption on each individual's concern for the enviroment 
, we postpone its discussion in section 3.2. 
7 Qualitatively similar results can be obtained for other values of α  and β as long as they are equal. 
8 Note that every agent's utility function is transferable and hence can be summed over all agents. 
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(7)
n
aPoi 2
=  
 
 
giving rise to the corresponding equal-split payoff:  
(8)( )
n
aPPU on
o
i 4
,...,
2
1 =  
 
Now, let us suppose that the government, in order to reduce the inefficiency 
due to the excessive consumption of the private good arising at the Nash 
equilibrium, aims at introducing a RPP denoted as t (that works as a 
Pigouvian tax) proportional to the use of the private good. Under certainty, 
the level of t needed to yield the Pareto optimum emission (7) can be 
obtained by solving the following equation:  
 
n
aP
n
taP oi
t
i 21
*
==
+
−
= , (9)
 
with solution given by:  
,1
2 n
nat o −=  
 
where in (9) represents the Nash equilibrium level of pollution after the 
tax is levied. The after tax level of utility for each agent, using (6) and (9) is 
given by: 
t
iP
*
(10) 
( ) 2**1 1,..., 


+
−
=
n
taPPU tn
t
i  
 
(11) 
Note that the after-tax level of utility (11) is lower than its corresponding 
level before the tax is levied (6). This happens because the reduction of utility 
due to the lower consumption of the private good and the lower amount of 
money are not sufficiently compensated by the enhanced environmental 
quality. In a deterministic context, as the one described above, the social 
acceptability of such a RPP would require a reimbursement of the revenues 
raised by the tax. However, it can be argued that, in presence of perfect far 
sighted individuals, able to discount future stream of utilities, such a policy 
could loose some of its desired corrective effects. These considerations lead 
us to focus throughout the paper on the pre-transfer political acceptability of 
the policy.9  
 10
                                                 
9 It is well known that, if agents' utilities are quasi-linear, a lump sum reimbursement does not affect the 
3.2   Heterogeneous agents 
In this section we introduce a simple form of heterogeneity in , the agents' 
evaluation of the initial quality of the environment. To keep things simple, let 
distribute uniformly within the interval 
ia
ia [ aa, ] , where a  and a  represent, 
respectively, the lowest (pessimistic) and highest (optimistic) evaluation of 
the environment across agents.10 When agents maximize non cooperatively 
their payoff function (4), and there is perfect information on every as well 
as on the distribution of across the agents, each consumer's first order 
condition is given by:  
ia
ia
(12) ∑
∈
−=
Ni
iii PaP , 
 
that, summed up (12) over all agents, yields:  
∑∑∑
∈∈∈
−=
Ni
i
Ni
i
Ni
i PnaP  
 
 
(13) 
from which:  
(14) 
1+
=
∑∑ ∈
∈ n
a
P Ni i
Ni
i  
 
 
Inserting (14) into (12) and noting that, for the uniform distribution:  
( ) ,
2
naaa
Ni
i
+
=∑
∈
 
 
 
(15) 
we obtain, for every  :,Ni∈
                                                                                                                              
desired corrective effect of the tax. However, if individuals are assumed to know in advance that their 
after-tax reimbursement will be in some way proportional to the amount of tax levied, they could just 
marginally change their consumption. The extent of this change could depend, for instance, on each 
individual's expectation over the share of the tax that will be reimbursed. We will see that some of the 
model results can be put forward in terms of uncertainty over the reimbursement obtained after the RPP 
is levied. 
10 In the model a pessimistic/optimistic evaluations of the pollution-free environment (low/high level of 
) respectively imply a high/low individuals' concern for the environment. As mentioned above, 
can be interpreted as  where 
ia
ia ,ii raa += [ rri ,0∈ ] represents the amount of taxation reimbursed ex 
post to individual i. In this way all results reached below can be interpreted as referred to individuals 
with an identical environment concern and different expectations over the future reimbursement policy. 
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( )
( )12
*
+
+
−=
n
naaaP ii  (16) 
 
with an equilibrium payoff:  
( ) .12
)(,
2
** 


+
+
−=

 ∑
∈ n
naaaPPU i
Ni
iii  
 
(17) 
It has to be noticed that, although individuals are uniformly disposed within 
the support [ , the higher the density of consumers, the lower is their Nash 
equilibrium payoff. Compared to the continuous case, discrete distributions 
are able to capture this ''crowding effect'' as due to the presence of more 
polluting consumers in the economy.  
]aa,
Now, assuming that the government wants to impose a proportional pricing 
policy on the consumption  of the  private good,  the following equilibrium 
payoff is obtained: 
( )
2
**
112
)(, 


+
−
+
+
−=

 ∑
∈ n
t
n
naaaPPU i
Ni
t
i
t
ii  
 
(18) 
Here, again, the RPP reduces individuals' equilibrium utilities and, 
without redistribution and under certainty, it will not be accepted by 
consumers.  
Is this still the case under individual specific uncertainty? Could 
individuals accept an efficient pricing policy ex ante although they reject it ex 
post?  
In the following section we test the acceptability of a RPP before transfers 
can occur, in two different cases: in the first, individuals are assumed to 
possess initially identical evaluation of the environmental quality while, in the 
second, they are characterized by different initial evaluations of the 
environment. We explore the political acceptability of a RPP in these two 
cases under the assumption that individuals are uncertain over their post-
policy evaluations of the environment: although everybody knows that ex 
post, after the policy has been imposed, a  will distribute uniformly within i
[ aa, ]  each agent is uncertain on what will be her own evaluation  after the 
policy is imposed.  
ia
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3.3 Unanimity road pricing with initially homogeneous 
agents 
 
In this section we introduce a form of individual specific uncertainty 
regarding the individuals' perception of the environmental quality.11 This 
uncertainty is assumed to be individual specific since, when the politician 
announces the policy, each individual is uncertain of what will be her own 
actual post-policy evaluation of the environment , only knowing that will 
distribute uniformly across individuals within 
ia ia
[ a, ]a . This is a symmetric form 
of individual uncertainty, because each initially identical agent possesses 
equal probability to end up with one of the n concerns [ aaai ,∈
ia
] . Therefore, to 
verify the ex ante unanimous acceptability of the policy, 12 we need to 
calculate each consumer's expected payoff when there is equal probability to 
end up with one of the n different individual evaluations , given that their 
final distribution is known ex ante to everybody and equal to [ ]aa, . 
We know that with a proportional road pricing t , every agent's ex post 
equilibrium payoff will be:  
( )
2
**
112
)(, 



+
−
+
+
−=

 ∑
∈ n
t
n
naaaPPU i
Ni
t
i
t
ii  (19) 
 
Given that each individual has equal probability to end up with any of the 
environmental concerns [ aaai ,∈ ], the expected payoff of a risk neutral 
agent will be given by: 
( ) ( )
2
**
1 112
)(1,. 



+
−
+
+
−= ∑
∈ n
t
n
naa
a
n
PPEU i
Ni
t
n
t
i  
Now, the level of congestion price required for a unanimous ex ante 
acceptance of the policy by all agents will require that the expected payoff 
(20) be greater or equal than the status quo Nash equilibrium utility (6):  
(20) 
( ) ( **1**1 ,...,,. nitnti PPUPPEU ≥ )
                                                
 (21) 
 
that is: 
 
11 This uncertainty could also be thought of as the effect of a costless information campaign against the 
intensive use of the private good (car) accompanying the introduction of the RPP. 
12 Since in this case individuals are initially identical, if a policy is accepted by one individual, it will be 
accepted unanimously. 
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( )( )
( ) ( )2
22
1 112
21
+
≥





+
++
−∑
= n
a
n
tnaaa
n i
n
i
 
 
 
(22)
that, after some manipulations can be written as: 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )112
2
2
1
+
≥





+
++
−
+
n
a
n
tnaannaa
n
 (23)
 
whose unique solution, for any initial , is:  a
 
n
anaat 2
2
1 −+
=  (24) 
 
In figure 5 we plot the level of the ex ante unanimously accepted t for 
different number of individuals. A greater number of individuals mean in the 
model lower pre-policy Nash equilibrium payoff (6) and also lower after-tax 
ex ante expected payoff (20), but the latter decreases less than the former with 
respect to . This implies that, within a given range, higher levels of 
become unanimously politically acceptable, the greater is the number of 
individuals (voters) in the economy. The density of consumers matters. It can 
also be seen that ex ante acceptability requires in general a lower level of 
pricing policy (so implying a higher level of pollution) than the initial 
deterministic Pareto optimal pricing (10) (thin line in the graph).  
n
t
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The other clear effect on t is that of , the initial concern for the environment 
before the tax: higher initial concern for the environment (lower ) means 
higher chance to make the RPP politically acceptable. This is in line with 
intuition: when individuals are initially highly concerned with the 
a
a
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environment, they are also prone to accept high level of pricing to reduce 
pollution. In figure 6, we can see that t  becomes higher than when the 
initial concern become higher than that in figure 1, and equal to . This 
suggest the need, before proposing a RPP in a context characterized by 
individual specific uncertainty, to prepare appropriate information campaigns 
(i.e., campaigns able to appropriately change people' initial concern ).  
ot
=a 5.1
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further simulations show that, when a high pricing policy is imposed, a large 
number of consumers and, in particular, the ones with high concerns for the 
environment, will stop consuming the private good and then polluting. 
Therefore, from (17), their payoff will be equal to zero and every voter's 
expected payoff will be scaled down as a result. According to this fact, the 
model suggests that the policy makers can basically adopt different policies to 
make the RPP politically acceptable: they can either select a gradual and low 
level of pricing that keeps most of private good consumers in the market and 
that, with appropriate information campaigns, can receive a sufficiently high 
political acceptability; or, alternatively, they can choose a radical policy 
pushing out some of the consumers (the most concerned with the 
environment) thus guaranteeing a reasonably high payoff for the remaining 
ones (the less concerned for the environment) and, then, in probability, for all 
consumers. Again, also this type of policy might require a given amount of 
investments in information campaigns against pollution (to move people' 
initial concern  toward more favorable levels). a 13  
                                                 
13 Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by the utility function adopted, only depending on one 
private and one public good, we believe that the dichotomous policy result reported above would still 
hold under other specification of people preferences, since Cobb-Douglas utility function does not 
easily give rise to corner solutions. 
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 3.4  Majority road pricing with initially heterogeneous 
agents 
 
We consider here the case in which, before the RPP is announced, each 
individual possesses a different concern for the environment . Again, also 
here there is uncertainty, and the agents consider equally likely to end up with 
one of the n  different concern  after the RPP has been adopted. However, 
the main difference is that, in this case, the concern  that is politically 
relevant is that of the median voter, i.e., with uniform preferences, the 
individual with a concern a  located just to the right of the mid point of the 
distribution,
ia
ia
ia
i
( )
2
aa + . In fact, to be accepted the policy has to convince the 
majority of voters and this, by the median voter theorem, is equal to say that 
the voter with median concern has to possess an expected payoff higher 
than her own status quo Nash equilibrium payoff. Under the assumption of an 
even number of individuals, the median concern is equal to:  
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(25) 
Using this fact and (19) and (20), the condition for gaining the majority of 
votes becomes:  
(26) ( ) ( **1**1 ,...,,., nmtnti PPUPPEU ≥ ) 
 
 
that can be written as:  
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whose solution is:  
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(28) 
In this case, an interesting comparison can be made between the road pricing 
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level accepted by majority voting (28) and the average Pareto tax t : oM
14  
( )
n
naat oM
1
4
−+
=  (29) 
In figure 7, the ex ante majority acceptable congestion price (28) (thick line) 
and the average optimal price (29) (thin line) are plotted for 1=a , 7=a , and 
. It is purposedly shown that a radical policy against the excessive 
consumption of the private good (a tax that would push out of the market a 
high percentage of people but, of course, not the median) can be made 
sustainable by the majority of citizens as long as the number of people in the 
constituency is sufficiently high (otherwise a subsidy instead of a tax would 
be needed to make the policy package acceptable).  
50,..1=n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many other simulations can be performed. However, the message of the 
model presented here is clear: the existence of individual specific uncertainty 
can either be an advantage or a disadvantage for the policy makers that intend 
to propose a RPP. Information campaigns in favor of the environment as well 
as a high density of people consuming the public good are both factors that 
make ex ante political acceptability, ceteris paribus, relatively easier. The 
possibility for the policy makers to make acceptable a radical tax, excluding 
from the consumption of the polluting good a high percentage of population 
appears to increase under majority voting: here it can be clearly envisaged a 
tax that, although excluding all consumers having a concern for the 
environment higher than the median one, still can be made ex ante acceptable 
to the majority of population. The policy maker does not even need to know 
each individual's preferences, but only their final distribution across its 
potential electorate (here made of all population ).  n
                                                 
14 The policy maker cannot ascertain ex ante each individual's ex post concern for the environment , 
but what will be the aggregate distribution. Therefore she cannot impose a personalized Pareto tax but 
only its average value, based on the average concern 
ia
2
aa + . The Pareto tax t  can thus obtained as 
before, 
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4  Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have considered the problem of the political acceptability of 
RPP. This is widely considered as a major problem, given the almost 
unanimous agreement on the efficiency properties of such a kind of policies.  
Why politicians do not adopt policies that are considered welfare-improving 
by economists? The political feasibility has been evaluated in a context 
characterized by a re-election constraint of the policy-maker adopting the 
policy. We have tested the acceptability of the policy proposal both via a 
unanimity as well as a majority voting rules. The politicians were supposed to 
be willing to adopt policies that would prove to be ex ante beneficial for 
either all or a majority of the individuals affected by it. The innovative aspect 
of the analysis relates to the introduction, in the political acceptability 
evaluation process, of an individual specific uncertainty about the effects of 
the RPP on individuals' evaluation of the quality of the environment.  
We have introduced our argument by presenting two generic numerical 
examples illustrating the impact of the adoption of an individual specific 
uncertainty hypothesis on the distribution of gains and losses among 
individuals. When a RPP is implemented in a context of individual specific 
uncertainty a case can be made to explain, that it is both possible to have ex 
post welfare improving policies that are not voted for ex ante as well as 
welfare decreasing policies ex post that are voted for ex ante. The presence of 
individual specific uncertainty distorts aggregate preferences.  
We have then presented a simple model in which individuals are uncertain 
about the effects of a RPP on their future environmental concern.  
Our results show that the RPP passing a unanimity voting test possesses the 
following features: it depends both positively on the number of the 
individuals involved and on their initial environmental concern. Moreover, in 
general, the ex ante acceptability of the policy may require a lower level of 
pricing than the Pareto optimal one. More in detail, we have shown that this is 
true when individuals are initially characterized by a low concern for the 
environment.  
When every individual is initially characterized by a non homogeneous 
concern of the environment and considers equally likely ending up with one 
of the many concerns after the policy is implemented, the political feasibility 
is determined by the preferences of the median voter. Even in this situation an 
average Pareto optimal tax could be made acceptable through an appropriate 
taxation path progressively moving towards efficiency, where information 
campaigns in favour of a non polluted environment could play a relevant role.  
Future extensions of the model might be, among others, to address the 
following issues: look more in detail at the effects of an information 
campaign, explore the effects produced by different distributions of 
preferences, assume different transition patterns for individuals' preferences 
as effect of a RPP.  
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